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4ABSTRACT
Assessments of the performance of Indian commercial banks are
not new in the literature. However, most of the earlier studies consider
relatively partial measures such as technical efficiency of the banks in
assessing their performance. We have considered overall (Malmquist)
total factor productivity improvement achieved by 68 Indian commercial
banks from 1998-99 to 2006-07, the true liberalised era in some senses,
and decomposed it into the three of its economically meaningful
components, namely technical change, technical efficiency change and
scale (efficiency) change factor using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
methodology. Our results suggest that public-sector banks are, on an
average, adjusting themselves to the changing environment better and
improving their performance relative to their counterparts under private
and foreign ownership. The latter were widely believed to do better
under the new regime because of their relatively more flexible operating
systems as well as better market orientation. This finding clearly has
important policy implications in determining the government’s attitude
towards overall market-orientation of the Indian banking sector. To be
specific, the government should more cautiously approach liberalising
the banking sector and should not blindly invite more foreign players to
it. The lesson becomes particularly more relevant at a time when we are
witnessing a severe global crisis which, although  began with the bursting
of the US housing market bubble, gathered momentum from a series of
bankruptcies of the so-called “too big to fail” banks with Lehman
Brothers in the lead.
JEL Classification: C43, D24, G28
Key Words:   Total Factor Productivity; Technical Change; Technical
Efficiency Change; Scale (Efficiency) Change Factor; Data
Envelopment Analysis; Liberalisation
51. Introduction
A recognition of the need of an efficient financial sector to promote
overall economic development can be traced all the way back to the
early 20th century when Joseph Schumpeter (1911) argued in his Theory
of Economic Development that scarcity of finance is a serious obstacle
to development. Cross-country experience also suggests that the
existence of a healthy, efficient and competitive financial sector, which
Joseph Stiglitz (1998) termed the “brain” of the economy, is a necessary
pre-condition for rapid economic development. This necessity is more
pronounced in the case of backward or so-called developing economies
because the opportunity cost of capital is more in them, coupled with
underdeveloped financial markets (Smith, 1998). Further, inefficiency
in financial intermediation carries with it the possibility of misallocation
of funds, which could result in more non-performing assets (Barman,
2007).
Financial intermediaries such as banks are major players in
any financial market, and their overall performance is therefore an
important determinant of the performance of the financial sector
concerned, in particular, and that of the overall economy, in general.
Over time, the banking systems in many developing economies
performed poorly, and researchers diagnosed it as a direct consequence
of the excessive regulations that were in place. However, the experience
with deregulation in the banking sector has been mixed in nature.
6Empirical studies in the US show that measured cost productivity actually
decreased following deregulation (Bauer, Berger and Humphrey, 1993;
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Berger and Mester, 2001). On the other
hand, a study by Chaffai (1997) analysed the deregulation experience
in Tunisia and found that total factor productivity (TFP) of banks
increased following a liberalisation programme initiated in 1986.
However, the rate of technical progress was higher than the rate of
productivity growth, implying that the banks, on an average, became
less efficient after liberalisation.1 Thus the issue of whether financial
deregulation actually helps overall development or sometimes can be
so counterproductive as to hinder the process of development may be
an interesting subject of debate. The issue becomes more relevant in
view of the on-going global economic crisis, which originated in the US
mortgage lending market and soon spread to others. As noted by analysts,
uncontrolled financial innovations introduced by investment agencies
and other banks, as well as by some other financial institutions, was one
of the major causes of the crisis. The objective of the present paper is to
study the overall performance of major Indian commercial banks in the
post-financial deregulation period through a thorough analysis of their
TFP growth and its major components.
It is useful to briefly recall here the nature of the Indian banking
system at the time financial sector reforms were initiated in the early
1990s. This would facilitate a greater clarity of the rationale and basis of
reforms. The Indian financial system in the pre-reform period essentially
catered for the needs of planned development in a mixed economy
where the government sector played a dominant role in economic
activity. The strategy of planned economic development required huge
development expenditure, which was met thorough the government
ownership of major banks, an automatic monetisation of the fiscal deficit
1 See Casu and Molyneux (2003) for an extensive survey of the relevant
literature on performance of banks.
7and by subjecting the banking sector to large pre-emptions—both in
terms of the statutory holding of government securities (statutory
liquidity ratio, or SLR) and the administrative direction of credit to
preferred sectors. Further, a complex structure of administered interest
rates prevailed, guided more by social priorities, necessitating cross-
subsidisation to sustain the commercial viability of institutions. These
not only distorted the interest rate mechanism but also adversely affected
development of the financial market (Rangarajan, 2007).
Contrary to this, financial reforms in India created an enabling
environment for banks to overcome external constraints and operate
with greater flexibility. Such measures related to dismantling the
administered structure of interest rates, and the removal of several pre-
emptions to do with reserve requirements and credit allocation to certain
sectors. Interest rate deregulation was carried out in stages, allowing
sufficient resilience to build up in the system. This was an important
component of the reform process, which has made resource allocation
more efficient. A parallel strengthening of prudential regulation,
improved market behaviour, gradual financial opening and, above all,
underlying improvements in macroeconomic management helped the
liberalisation process run smooth. Interest rates have now been largely
deregulated, except for certain specific classes such as savings deposit
accounts, non-resident Indian (NRI) deposits, small loans up to Rs. 2
lakh, export credit, and the like. Other major objectives of banking
sector reforms were enhancing efficiency and productivity through
increased competition and, for that, modifying the overall legal
environment for conducting banking business in India. Establishment
of new banks was allowed in the private sector and foreign banks were
also permitted more liberal entry. Yet another step towards enhancing
competition was allowing foreign direct investment in private-sector
banks up to 74% from all sources. As for the modification of the legal
environment, the Securitisation Act was enacted in 2002 to enhance
protection of creditor rights. To combat the abuse of the financial system
8for crime-related activities, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
was also enacted in 2002 to provide the enabling legal framework. The
Negotiable Instruments (Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 2002 expanded the erstwhile definition of “cheque” by introducing
the concept of “electronic money” and “cheque truncation”. The Credit
Information Companies (Regulation) Act 2005 is expected to enhance
the quality of credit decisions and facilitate faster credit delivery.
However, as pointed out by Barman (2007), two distinct phases
are discernable in the reform of the Indian banking system. The first
phase, 1992-98, can be thought of as a period of transition from a
regulated regime to one in which there was a gradual adaptation of
international standards. The second phase, the post-1998 period, can be
considered the “true” post-liberalisation period. In this regime, banks
were able to enjoy almost full freedom in pricing their products. In sharp
contrast to the earlier phase, this regime was perceived as more
accommodative towards competition. Further, the entry of new private
banks and some foreign banks to the industry made a significant change
in the structure of the Indian banking sector. For one, there has been
increasing competition among banks (as reflected in their share of
expenditure on advertising and publicity as a proportion of total
operating cost), and the share of publicly owned banks, though still the
largest among the major bank groups, has been gradually diminishing
over time (Table 1). These changes necessarily make the individual
players more market-oriented and call for them to improve their
performance. Our concern in this paper is whether such anticipation
holds good for the Indian banking industry in the ‘‘true’’ post-
liberalisation period. For that, we have examined TFP changes that
have taken place in the last year we have considered, 2006-07,  over the
year 1998-99. We also decompose such TFP changes into its major
components such as technological change, change in technical efficiency
of banks and so on to identify the principal driving force(s) of TFP
changes in Indian banking over this period.
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In this connection, we briefly review some of the important recent
work on the performance of the Indian banking sector. Using data
envelopment analysis (DEA) to analyse data on 70 Indian commercial
banks from 1986 to 1991, Bhattacharyya et al (1997) found that publicly
owned Indian banks are the most efficient among all ownership
categories considered in the study, followed by foreign-owned banks
and Indian private banks respectively. However, they also found
something odd (and almost diametrically opposite) when the inter-
temporal behaviour of such performance was considered. Evidence of
temporal improvement was seen in the performance of foreign-owned
banks, virtually no such trend in that of Indian private banks and a
temporal decline in that of the publicly owned banks. They explained
these patterns in terms of the government’s evolving regulatory policies.
A study by Sarkar et al (1998) (with the motive of evaluating enterprise
performance under different ownership patterns) confirmed that in the
absence of a well-functioning capital market, there might not be any
significant difference in the performance of public- and private-sector
banks. Their analysis highlighted the importance of creating an
appropriate institutional background before pushing privatisation in
developing economies. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) analysed the
relationship between deregulation and TFP growth in the Indian banking
industry using a generalised shadow cost function approach. Analysing
disaggregated panel data on a population of public and private banks
from 1985 to 1996, they found evidence in favour of a significant decline
in regulatory distortions and also non-materialisation of anticipated
TFP growth until 1996. Using DEA, Sathye (2003) measured the
productive efficiency of banks in India for the year 1997-98. The
efficiency scores, for three groups of banks—publicly owned, privately
owned and foreign—were measured. The study showed that the mean
efficiency score of Indian banks compared well with the world mean
efficiency score and the efficiency of private-sector commercial banks
as a group was paradoxically lower than that of public-sector banks and
foreign banks in India. The study also recommended that the existing
policy of reducing non-performing assets and rationalisation of staff
11
and branches might be continued to obtain efficiency gains and make
Indian banks internationally more competitive. Chakrabarti and Chawla
(2005) used DEA to evaluate the relative efficiency of Indian banks
during 1990-2002 and observed that on a “value” basis, foreign banks
as a group had been considerably more efficient than all other bank
groups, followed by Indian private banks. However, from a “quantity”
perspective, the Indian private banks seemed to be doing very well
while the foreign banks were the worst off. This, as it can be easily
understood, might be a reflection of the general policy of foreign banks
to “cherry-pick” more profitable businesses, ignoring the social
obligation of offering banking services to a wider section of society.
Further, public-sector banks were seen to be lagging behind their private
counterparts in performance. Das and Ghosh (2006) investigated the
performance of the Indian commercial banking sector during the post-
reform period 1992-2002. Using DEA, they applied all the three different
approaches—intermediation approach, value-added approach and
operating approach—to differentiate how efficiency scores varied with
changes in inputs and outputs. The analysis also linked the variation in
calculated efficiencies to a set of variables such as bank size, ownership,
capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans, management quality, and
so on. Their findings suggested that medium-sized public-sector banks
performed reasonably well and were more likely to operate at higher
levels of technical efficiency. A close relationship was observed between
efficiency and soundness as determined by a bank’s capital adequacy
ratio. Their empirical results also showed some evidence in favour of
the expected relationship that technically more efficient banks were
those that had, on an average, less non-performing loans. To evaluate
the impact of computerisation2 on the productivity and profitability of
2 Indian banks are now investing heavily in computerised technologies such
as tele-banking, mobile banking, net banking, automated teller machines
(ATMs), credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, call centres, customer
relationship management (CRM), data warehousing and the like. All these
facilities, which are new innovations in banking technologies, help the
Indian banking system improve its service quality, particularly by lowering
the time cost associated with each transaction, to a huge extent.
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Indian banks, Mittal and Dhingra (2007) applied DEA methodology to
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) data on 27 selected
Indian commercial banks over the years 2003-04 and 2004-05. They
observed that private-sector banks, which took more information
technology (IT) initiatives, were more efficient in terms of the productivity
and profitability parameters than their counterparts under public
ownership. Das, Ray and Nag (2009)3 used DEA to measure the labour-
use efficiency of individual branches of a public-sector bank with a
large network of branches across India. They found considerable
variation in the average levels of efficiency of bank branches across the
four metropolitan regions considered in the study. They also introduced
the concept of area or “spatial efficiency” for each region relative to the
nation as a whole. The results suggested that the policies, procedures,
and incentives handed down from the corporate level could not fully
neutralise the detrimental influence of local work culture across different
regions. Most of the potential reduction in labour cost appeared to be
coming from possible downsizing of the clerical and subordinate staff.
We thus see that the issues raised earlier are yet to be explored to
a great extent and that is precisely the objective of this paper. The paper
is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly states the analytical
methodology we consider here. Section 3 describes the data set we have
used and our major findings from analysing it, and Section 4 concludes.
2. Analytical Methodology
The productivity of a firm is measured by the quantity of output
produced by it per unit of input. In the simplest single-input–single-
output case, it is merely the ratio of the quantity of the firm’s output to
its input. But in a more general case where a number of inputs are used
3 However, this study is to some extent different to the others mentioned
above in the sense that the others deal with different Indian commercial
banks while this one deals with different branches of a single public-sector
bank.
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to produce a number of outputs, outputs (in the numerator) as also inputs
(in the denominator) are to be meaningfully aggregated so that the
productivity still remains the ratio of two scalar values. The productivity
index of a firm for a current period relative to a base period measures the
relative change in its productivity in the latter period relative to the
earlier. Such a productivity index may be of two types—positive and
normative. Positive measures are those measurements where one need
not know the production technology. The Fisher productivity index
and the Tornqvist productivity index are two such popular positive
measures discussed in the literature. On the other hand, measurement of
the Malmquist productivity index, a normative measure, requires
knowledge about the benchmark production technology. Since our
objective in this paper is to measure the productivity change of Indian
commercial banks over the last eight years and decompose such change
into economically meaningful components such as technical change,
technical efficiency change and the scale (efficiency) change factor to
get the relative importance of these factors causing changes in TFP, we
consider the Malmquist productivity index here.4
Malmquist Productivity Index and its Decomposition
As we have already mentioned, the Malmquist productivity index
is a normative measure; an associated benchmark technology has to be
taken into account to measure it. Since production technology itself
may change over time, either of the technology of the base period and
the current period may be used as the benchmark. To be specific, let us
assume that (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) are the input-output combinations of a
firm in the periods 0 and 1 respectively. Then change in the Malmquist
TFP index from period 0 to period 1 can be written as
4 Interested readers may look up Ray (2004, Chapter 11) for a detailed
discussion on popular productivity indices of both the positive and normative
kind.
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where fi (•) and Ri (•) are the production frontiers of the thi  period,
assuming that the production technology exhibits variable returns to
scale (VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS) respectively, and the
two concerned production possibility set be denoted by T and TC
respectively.5 Therefore, Π0 and Π1  may be different if  the production
technology itself changes from period 0 to period 1. To get rid of such
complexity, the conventional way is to measure the index once
considering the base period technology as the benchmark and once
again considering the technology of the current period, and then take
the geometric average of these two measures to obtain the overall change
in the Malmquist TFP index. Thus the overall measure of changes of the
Malmquist TPF index can be written as follows:
Π = [Π
0
  X  Π
1
]1/2
Let us discuss first the concepts of technical efficiency (TE) and
scale efficiency of a production unit with the help of the diagram below.
Let ATBC (in Figure 1) be the production frontier (exhibiting VRS
technology with other usual desirable properties). An (output-oriented)
measure of TE of firm F, as defined to be the ratio of actually produced
amount of output to the frontier level of output for the given level of
input used by this firm, is given by which is equal
5  Clearly f (•) and R (•) are the north-western boundary of  T and TC respectively.
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to the ratio of productivity, as defined to be the amount of output per
unit of input used, at the point F to that at the point B. Note that TE is
identical (and equal to unity) at all points on the frontier, but productivity
is not. It is easy to see that productivity is the highest at the point T
among all feasible points (that is, those that lie within the production
possibility set). Hence, OX* is the size relating to the concept of
technically optimal production scale (TOPS)  (a la Frisch, 1965), and
the widely known, most productive scale size (MPSS) (a la Banker,
1984) in the diagram. Output-oriented scale efficiency of a firm is defined
to be the ratio of productivity at its (output-oriented) projection on to
the frontier to that at the MPSS. Similarly, input-oriented measure of
scale efficiency of a firm is the ratio of productivity at its (input-oriented)
projection on to the frontier to that at the MPSS. In other words, scale
efficiency is a measure of the relative productivity of a firm with respect
to productivity at the MPSS, if the firm becomes able to eliminate its
technical inefficiency in production and, therefore, naturally it lies
between 0 and 1.6 So, scale efficiency of any firm lies on the vertical line
 BX1 is,   **
11
OXTX
OXBX
 which is the ratio of productivity at point B to that
at point T, and (the input-oriented) scale efficiency of any firm that lies
on the horizontal line B1F is the ratio of productivity at the point B1 to
that at point T. But, productivity at point T is equivalent to that of the
hypothetical firms at point D and D1. Although, these points are not
feasible under the VRS technology, they are on the graph of the CRS
technology. Thus,  
1
1
11
11
**
11
DX
BX
OXDX
OXBX
OXTX
OXBX
11
11
BXFX
DXFX
6 Note that scale efficiency does not state anything about the actual scale of
production relative to the MPSS, in the sense that one cannot say whether
the firm is actually practising more or less than the MPSS by simply observing
its scale efficiency score.
= = =
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and similarly we can show that the ratio of productivity at B1 to that at
D1 is equal to the ratio 
FYBY
FYDY
111
111
.   So, scale efficiency of a firm is the
ratio of its TE under the CRS technology to that under the VRS
technology, irrespective of the orientation of the measurement of
technical efficiency.
Let us now define the concept of output-oriented distance
function (a la Shephard, 1953) here. The (output-oriented) distance
function evaluated at  any input-output  pair (x, y) is   given   by
    if      production
technology is assumed to exhibit VRS (or CRS). So, it can be easily
understood that the (output-oriented) TE and the (output-oriented)
distance function are the same. However, using distance functions, Π
can be shown, a la Ray and Desli (1997), to be the product of three
economically meaningful components: technical change (TC), technical
efficiency change (TEC) and scale (efficiency) change factor (SCF) and
these components can be shown as follows:
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where superscript and subscript of D are used to indicate,
respectively, the period of technology considered as the benchmark and
assumed returns to scale specification for the technology respectively.7
Before Ray-Desli, Färe et. al. (1992) introduced a decomposition of the
Malmquist TFP index assuming that the true production technology
exhibits CRS. According to their decomposition, Π can be shown to be
the  product  of  two  different  components:  a   measure   of  technical
change,  which is the (un-weighted) geometric
mean of the shift in the true (CRS) production function at input levels x0
and x1, and technical efficiency change 
1
1 1
0
0 0
( )
( )
y R x
y R x
,– again using
the true (CRS) production function as the benchmark. Note that, if the
production technology truly exhibits CRS, the last component, that is,
SCF of Ray-Desli decomposition disappears whereas the other two
7 V for VRS and C for CRS.
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components exactly match these two components of Färe et al (1992).
Since globally CRS is a restrictive assumption about the underlying
technology, when CRS does not hold everywhere, Färe et al (1992)
decomposition is not particularly meaningful. In an effort to
accommodate VRS, Färe et al (1994) proposed the extended
decomposition according to which the Malmquist TFP index can be
written as a product of three different components: a measure of technical
change ,   
 
1 2
1 1
0 1
0 0
0 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
R x R x
R x R x
⎡ ⎤
×⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
; a measure of technical efficiency change,
 1
1 1
0
0 0
( )
( )
y f x
y f x
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
; and a measure of scale efficiency change, 
 1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
f x R x
f x R x
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.
But Ray and Desli (1997) rightly argued that the first component of Färe
et al (1994) is not an appropriate measure of technical change when
production technology does not follow CRS globally.
However, one particular disadvantage of the Ray-Desli
decomposition is that at most two (namely, the first and the third ones)
of their three decomposed components may not be obtained for some
observations if the quantity of any individual input of an observation in
the base (current) period is smaller than the smallest quantity of the
corresponding input across all firms in the current (base) period. However,
we follow only the Ray-Desli measure8 in our study.
From the description of the distance function provided earlier, it
is easy to see that the (Shepherd) distance function is identical to Farrell's
(1957) measure of (output-oriented) technical efficiency and can,
therefore, be obtained straightway by solving the various DEA linear
8 Simar and Wilson (1998) decomposed the Malmquist TFP index further
and provide more economically meaningful interpretation of both of the
technical change and the scale change factor of the Färe et al (1994) and
Ray-Desli (1997) measures. Interested readers may look up the paper for
this decomposition. However, we do not consider their decomposition in
the present study.
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programming (LP) problems for alternative technological specifications.
For instance, the “same-period” VRS distance function for the thk
production unit can be shown to be    
*D ( , ) 1tV t t kx y ϕ=
  where
*
maxkϕ ϕ=
 such  that the four constraints: (i) 
1
N
t t
i i
i
y λ
=
∑ t
kyϕ≥
,  (ii)
1
N
t t
i i
i
x λ
=
∑
t
kx≤
,  (iii) 
1
 
N
t
i
i
λ
=
∑ = 1  and   (iv) t
iλ 0 ≥
 for all  i, are satisfied.
Similarly the “cross-period” VRS distance function for the  kth production
unit can be shown to be      such
that the four constraints: 
for all i, are satisfied.  We have to solve these
two LP problems without the constraint (iii) to get the CRS distance
functions for same-period and cross-period respectively.9  In the above LP
problems, any one of s and t can be  used as an indicator of the base period and
the other as an indicator of the current period.
3. Data Used and Empirical Findings
A major problem one has to face in empirical banking research is
defining the “inputs” and “outputs” of banks. Due to its ambiguous
nature of use, an asset/liability may either be considered as an output of
a bank or as its input used to produce some other output. For instance, if
we view banks as service providers to their customers, as the production
approach does,10 deposits of banks should be taken as an output. On the
other hand, it should be included in the set of inputs if we consider a
bank to be an intermediating entity between savers and investors whose
9 Interested readers may look up Ray (2004, Ch. 2, 3) for an explicit discussion
on the formation of the respective production possibility set for alternative
technological specifications and how the associated LP problems are
structured from that.
10 Which we shall discuss later in detail.
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goal is to earn profit through lending and investing resources collected
from customers in the form of deposits. In view of such complexity, four
approaches have come to dominate the literature on banking output—
the production approach, the intermediation approach, the operating
(income-based) approach and, more recently, the modern approach.11
We use a variant of the intermediation approach (subject to our data
availability constraint) where deposits and borrowings and other liabilities,
together with real resources such as labour, are defined as inputs whereas the
output set includes earning assets such as loans and investments (Model I,
hereafter).12 We also use the production approach (Model II, hereafter) to
see whether the basic results to the performance-related issues
considered in the present study change drastically or not due to merely
changes in the approach to defining the inputs and outputs of banks.
We use individual bank-level (yearly) data for 68 major Indian
commercial banks for the years 199913 and 2007.  The data is taken from
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) website.  On a totality, we have data on
eight State Banks of India (SBI) and its associates and 20 banks each
from the other publicly owned, privately owned and foreign-owned
categories. The input and output variables we have used in our analysis
are discussed below.
Model  I
As we have already mentioned, number of employees, total
deposits and sum of borrowing and other liabilities are considered as
three inputs whereas investments and advances are considered as two
outputs.
11 Interested readers may look up Berger et. al. (1992), Frexias et. al. (1997),
Mohan (2006), for detailed discussions on these approaches.
12 This is also known as the “asset approach”.
13 The year 1999 refers to the financial year beginning in April 1998 and
ending in March 1999. Similarly, the year 2007 refers to the financial year
April 2006 – March 2007. We adopt this convention throughout the paper.
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Model  II
As per the production approach, the total number of deposits
created by a bank is considered its output. Since we have no information
about these numbers for all the three types of deposits a bank creates
(viz., demand deposits, saving deposits and term deposits), we have
taken their values and consider two different outputs—demand deposits
and ST deposits (which is the sum of savings deposits and term deposits).
Here we have considered the total number of employees, amount of
fixed assets and operating expenses  less payments to and provision for
employees (as a proxy of materials used by the bank) as three inputs.
We have adjusted the nominal figures of the variables mentioned
above by discounting/adjusting them using suitable interest rate/price
indicators. For instance, 2007 values of the variables investments and
advances are discounted by the average value of the SBI lending rate;
deposits are discounted by the average value of the deposit rate; and
borrowing and other liabilities are discounted by the average value of
the bank rate over the eight-year period (2000-2007). Similarly, variables
used in Model II are also adjusted by the average values of the proper
variables over this period. For instance, demand deposits and ST deposits
are discounted by the short-term (one to three years) and long-term
(more than three years) deposit rates respectively, fixed assets are adjusted
by the wholesale price index (WPI) of the machinery and equipment
group and the proxy variable for material used is adjusted by the WPI of
manufactured products.
Empirical Findings
We have used the econometric/statistical package SHAZAM to
solve the various DEA LP problems to determine the individual bank-
wise scores on TFP change and its components. The results we have
obtained are given in Table 2. As discussed earlier, one of the objectives
of using two alternative models in the present study is to see whether the
basic results regarding the performance-related issues of Indian
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commercial banks changes by simply changing the sets of their inputs
and outputs. Our answer to this question is clearly “no”, at least for the
sets of inputs and outputs we have considered. For instance, we present
scatter plots of TFP changes as well as of three of its components, showing
the correlation between these scores experienced by the individual
banks through one model relative to the other in Figure 2. In two—
those of technical change and scale (efficiency) change factor—of the
total four cases, there is clearly a positive correlation between the two
sets of scores. Although there is no such evidence of any positive
correlation in the remaining two cases, there is undoubtedly no negative
correlation between the two sets of scores. The positive correlation for
both technical change and scale (efficiency) change factor is also
confirmed by the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the
rankings of the banks on the basis of the two sets of scores obtained
through Model I and Model II. We observed that this correlation
coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero14 for these
two components of TFP change experienced by the 68 Indian commercial
banks we have considered.
Now we turn to the overall changes in the performance of the
Indian banks over the period 1999 to 2007. As can be easily understood
from our methodological discussion, technical change is a measure of
the extent of shift of the concerned frontier production function, it is,
14 We know that for sample size (n) more than or equal to 40, ,   is
approximately normally distributed with mean zero and variance unity,
where  ,  is the Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between the two sets of ranks of the observations and di is the
difference between these two sets of ranks for the ith observation. In our
sample, values of this statistic are 3.39 and 3.70 for technical change and
scale (efficiency) change factor respectively, which clearly exceed the
concerned tabulated value even at 1% level of significance.
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therefore, collectively determined by all the firms. So, there is relatively
little possibility of a firm in itself determining the index or score of its
technical change. Rather, firms as a whole play the major role in
determining it. Thus, although technical change of a firm is an important
component of its TFP change, the firm itself has little contribution in
determining it. Rather, two other components, namely technical
efficiency change and scale (efficiency) change factor, of a firm are
much more important determinants (in improving its overall
performance) and they are influenced by its own activity. So, in judging
the improvement of overall performance of a bank in our study we pay
more attention to the two latter components of its TFP change and
Figure 2:  Scatter Plot of TFP Change and Its Components through
One Model relative to the Other
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relatively less to the earlier. Table 2 shows that, on an average, the group
comprising the SBI and its associates improved its performance best in
the light of overall TFP change or any of its three components under
Model I. Other nationalised banks, private-sector banks and foreign
banks follow one after another in the same order. Contrary to this, the
order becomes foreign banks, other nationalised banks, the SBI group
and private-sector banks in the light of overall TFP change under Model
II. However, this improvement of the foreign bank group is mainly driven
by technical changes among its various members. If we consider only
technical efficiency improvement and improvement in scale (efficiency)
change, the two indicators that are mostly determined by the activity of
a bank itself, the story becomes almost the same as that which we have
observed under the Model I. Here again, the SBI group comes first, followed
by other nationalised banks, foreign banks and private-sector banks, one
after another. Therefore, even in a truly changed liberal economic
environment, the nationalised banks have adjusted and improved
themselves better compared to their counterparts under private or foreign
ownership.
We now turn to individual bank-wise performance by conducting
some fractile group analysis. To be specific, we order the individual
banks according to the change in their overall performance and three of
its components and consider only the top 17 banks (that is, 25% or
more) and see what their distribution is among the four bank groups.
This distribution, given in Table 3a and Table 3b, [showing a similar
distribution as that of the top 34 banks (that is, 50% or more)]. These
two tables show almost an identical distribution, which demonstrates
that public-sector banks have adjusted well to the changed scenario and
improved their performance better than their private as well as foreign
counterparts under Model I. On the other hand, under Model II, foreign
banks followed by private-sector banks were doing better relative to
their nationalised counterparts. Now the immediate question is why
then is the overall performance of foreign banks low as per the latter two
29
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indicators of TFP change even under Model II? The obvious answer is
that there are a few foreign banks such as Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank,
American Express Bank, Mashreq Bank, and Oman International Bank
within the foreign group and those like Development Credit Bank,
Dhanalakshmi Bank, and Lord Krishna Bank within the private group
which pull down the respective group averages for technical efficiency
change and scale (efficiency) change factor to excessively low levels.
By simply taking a close look at the output vector we have
considered under Model II, it can be easily understood why nationalised
banks are shown to be lagging behind their counterparts under foreign
and private ownership in this model. We have already argued that the
nationalised banks have more developmental as well as social
obligations than the other two groups of banks and distribute their
services among more and more economically backward regions, in
general, and rural areas, in particular. Thus, one of their declared
objectives, as a representative of the government, is to bring as many
people as possible into the formal financial system and relieve them
from the credit-cobweb of informal moneylenders. In doing so, they
have a large number of small customers but the total deposits collected
from them are also small. On the other hand, private-sector  and foreign
banks mainly target a fewer number of creditworthy customers and the
total deposits collected from them are relatively large. Since we have
used the total value of deposits created by a bank instead of the number
of deposits created by it, as proposed by the production approach, foreign
and private-sector banks seem to be better improving themselves when
compared to their nationalised counterparts. The picture may show the
opposite even under Model II if we were able to use the total number of
deposits created by a bank as its output.
4. Concluding Remarks
Assessments of the performance of Indian commercial banks are
not new in the literature. We have already discussed a few of them earlier
31
in this paper. As evident from our discussion, some earlier studies have
observed that nationalised banks perform relatively better than their
more liberalised counterparts under private and foreign ownership,
whereas others have got it the other way around. However, most of the
earlier studies considered relatively partial measures such as the technical
efficiency of the banks. We have considered overall TFP improvement
achieved by the individual banks and decomposed it into the three of
its economically meaningful components. Furthermore, we have
considered, in some sense, the "true" liberalised era of the Indian banking
sector as our study period and assessed the extent to which individual
banks have adjusted themselves to the new regime and improved in this
period. Our results suggest that public-sector banks are, on an average,
better adjusting themselves to the changing environment and improving
their performance relative to their counterparts under private and foreign
ownership. The latter were widely believed to do better under the new
regime, given their relatively more flexible operating systems as well as
their better market orientation. This finding clearly has important policy
implications for the government’s attitude towards overall market
orientation of the Indian banking sector. To be specific, the government
should more cautiously approach liberalising its banking sector and
not blindly invite more foreign players to it. The lesson becomes
particularly more relevant at a time when we are witnessing a severe
global crisis which, although  began with the bursting of the US housing
market bubble, gathered momentum from a series of bankruptcies of the
so-called “too big to fail” banks, with Lehman Brothers in the lead.
However, we have used DEA methodology, which is based on
mathematical programming techniques, without considering the possible
error structures that may affect the analysis. Since any methodology has
its relative advantages as well as disadvantageZs over its possible
alternatives, our analysis is not free from its respective limitations.
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